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THE INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
CREATED BY LEGALIZING PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE +
CLARKE D. FORSYTHE*
In two landmark decisions in 1997, the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that state laws banning assisted suicide without ex-
ception do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg,1 the Court held that Washington State's law
against assisted suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment either on its face or as applied to
competent, terminally ill adults. In light of the consistent, long-
standing, Anglo-American tradition of prohibiting assisted sui-
cide, "the asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is
not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause."2 In Vacco v. Quill,3 the Court held that New York
State's law does not violate the Equal Protection clause by pro-
hibiting assisted suicide while allowing the refusal or withdrawal
of lifesaving medical treatment. Such laws "neither infringe fun-
damental rights nor involve suspect classifications."4 The
"distinction between assisted suicide and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and en-
dorsed in the medical profession and in our legal tradition, is
both important and logical; it is certainly rational."5 All justices
joined the judgments upholding these laws.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court decisions, the forum for
this issue has begun to shift from the courts back to the public
* This article is an edited version of a presentation given at St. John's University School
of Law.
* B.A. Allegheny College (1980); J.D. Valparaiso University (1983). I am grateful to Nik
Nikas for comments on an earlier draft.
1 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2 Id. at 2271.
3 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
4 117 S. Ct. at 2297.
5 Id. at 2298.
680
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
policy arena.6 For that reason I would like to explore several
public policy questions this afternoon, specifically the incentives
and disincentives that would be created by the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide. While these incentives and disincen-
tives may not be explicit or immediate, they will be inexorable.
Public policy on this issue is really driven by three fears: Fear
of uncontrolled pain; fear of catastrophic healthcare costs; and
fear of abandonment, isolation, or loneliness during illness.7 Un-
fortunately the notion that has been frequently fostered is that
there are really only two alternatives: The first is uncontrolled
pain and suffering, and the other is ending it by assisted suicide.
In fact, the Second Circuit's opinion in Quill v. Vacco painted just
such a picture.8
Debates about physician-assisted suicide have a tendency to
imagine a case of a terminally ill patient who is imminently dy-
ing and in great suffering. In that particular case, the difference
between palliative care and an unauthorized lethal medication is
significant for that patient and that doctor. The social repercus-
sions in one case, however, are rather limited. The implications
become much more profound when society legalizes assisted sui-
cide and makes it one medical option among others in our health-
care system.
If society formally legalizes assisted suicide, the implications
are dramatically broadened.9 As you draw back from that event
in time, and sanction that act, dramatic incentives for doctors,
patients, family members, healthcare institutions, insurers, and
6 See, e.g., Charles H. Baron et. al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON. LEGIS. 1, 5-10 (1996) (proposing model statute le-
galizing assisted suicide and discussing public policy behind it); Peter G. Daniels, Com-
ment, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act: A Merciful End to a Terminally Ill
Criminal Tradition, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 773-80 (1997) (discussing case's impact on
pallative care centers).
7 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT:
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 120 (1994) [hereinafter
N.Y.S. TASK FORCE REPORT]; see also Yale Kamisar, Reasons Why So Many People Sup-
port Physician-Assisted Suicide-and Why These Reasons are Not Convincing, 12 ISSUES
L. & MED. 113, 113-14 (1996) (criticizing five arguments supporting physician-assisted
suicide and concluding that it should be prohibited); Thomas J. Marzen et. al., Suicide a
Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1985) (examining arguments for and against
physician assisted suicide and concluding that courts and legislatures should continue to
ban practice).
8 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997).
9 See, e.g., Thomas Maier, Death by Choice; Oregon Voters Back MD-Aided Suicide,
NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 6, 1997, at A5 (reporting that Oregon voters approved law al-
lowing prescription of life-ending drugs to terminally ill patients).
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society will be created.
An examination of the broad implications of legalizing assisted
suicide reveals that the best course of action is to improve the
care of the suffering individual while refusing to legalize assisted
suicide. 10 The risks simply outweigh the benefits.
First, there will be incentives to broaden the available class of
patients. "1 It would not be possible to legalize assisted suicide for
just one individual, although that is the way public opinion often
views this issue. In the context of an extreme case of patient suf-
fering, many will agree to allow suicide for that particular pa-
tient.
Courts and legislatures, however, do not work that way. As-
sisted suicide would have to be legalized for a class of patients
and frankly it is just impossible to coherently limit that class. 12
This was clearly demonstrated during the oral arguments before
the Supreme Court on January 8th.13 Several justices asked
counsel for suicide advocates to define the right in question, the
nature of that right, and the class to which it was applicable.14
They got a different answer every time they asked the ques-
tion. 15
Most of the criteria used to define a class are heavily subjec-
tive. This was the conclusion of the New York State's Task Force
Report on Life and the Law. Its report is the foremost public
policy document in the country on this question. 16
10 See N.Y.S. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 120; see also Report of the Arizona
Commission on Aging and End of Life Issues (Dec. 31, 1997) (recommending against legali-
zation of physician-assisted suicide).
11 See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 37-8 (1996) (comparing
proposed euthanasia bills in Michigan and New York).
12 See N.Y.S. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
13 See Vacco v. Quill, 1997 WL 13672 at *1 (U.S. Oral. Arg., Jan. 8, 1997) (NO. 95-1858)
[hereinafter Quill, Oral Arguments] (providing transcript of arguments before Court);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997 WL 13671 (U.S.Oral.Arg., Jan. 8, 1997) (NO. 96-110)
[hereinafter Glucksberg, Oral Arguments] (same).
14 See Quill, Oral Arguments, supra note 13, at *20. Justice Souter asked whether the
potential for abuse is greater in assisted suicide because the class that it applies to is
greater than the class requesting withdrawal of treatment. Id. Justice Ginsberg asked Mr.
Tribe what type of class physician-assisted suicide would be limited to. Id. at *39.
15 See, e.g., Glucksberg, Oral Arguments, supra note 13, at *29-31. Here, an advocate
for assisted suicide limited the class to those who were terminally ill and excluded those
who are in pain. Id. Another argued that personal autonomy to commit suicide should be
limited to those that have a terminal illness and those who are merely hastening their in-
evitable death. Id.
16 See N.Y.S. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7 (reporting findings of task force con-
vened by New York Governor Mario M. Cuomo in 1985 to study right to die); 1997
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Clearly it is not possible to limit the class to the terminally ill.
The notion of terminal illness is really a social definition, not a
medical definition. 17 The notion that doctors clearly know who is
or is not terminally ill is simply unfounded. Yet, doctors will be
the ones doing the monitoring based on subjective criteria. 18
Although limiting the class to the terminally ill provides the
appearance of simplicity, a moment's reflection shows that it does
not make sense. This is because if pain and suffering are the
basis for this new right, pain and suffering are not limited to the
terminally ill. Furthermore, it does not make sense legally, if the
Supreme Court's autonomy jurisprudence is the basis for this
new right. Just as the fifty states can not ask the reasons for, or
limit the right to, an abortion, they would not be able to ask the
reasons for or attempt to limit assisted suicide. 19
Secondly, legalizing assisted suicide will create disincentives to
properly diagnose and treat depression in the chronically and the
terminally ill.20 Many patients who make requests for death now
are suffering from a clinically diagnosable mental illness, 21 which
if diagnosed and treated, will often result in the patient revoking
the request for death.22
SUPPLEMENT TO NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW (Supp. 1997); see
also House of Lords, Session 1993-94 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics:
Volume 1-Report: Part 3 Opinion of the Committee, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 193, 194 (1996)
(rejecting change in Great Britain's assisted suicide prohibition).
17 See Richard M. Doerflinger, Conclusion: Shaky Foundations and Slippery Slopes, 35
DUQ. L. REV. 523, 525 (1996) ("Medical experts have found that the term 'terminally ill' is
not only difficult to apply, but almost impossible to define."); Roger S. Magnusson, The
Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social and Jurisprudential Aspects of the Euthanasia
Debate in Australia and the United States, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 44 (1997) (asserting
that definition of terminal illness will change if assisted suicide is legalized).
18 See Callahan & White, supra note 11, at 45-49 (describing criteria to be used and
methods of observation).
19 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992)
(reaffirming constitutional right to abortion including "health" abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (ruling that right to abortion includes "health" abortions after viabil-
ity); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (defining "health" to include physical as well as
mental well being).
20 See Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide: Meaning and Mo-
tivation, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 285, 285 (1996) (noting close to ninety-five percent of individuals
who seek suicide have diagnosable psychiatric illness).
21 See Annette E. Clark, Anatomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REV. 45, 129 (1996) (stating
"[tihe presence of depression is relevant if it is distorting rational decision making and is
reversible in a way that would substantially alter the situation."); Jody B. Gabel, Release
From Terminal Suffering? The Impact of AIDS on Medically Assisted Suicide Legislation,
22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369, 379 (1994) (pointing out that many AIDS patients who seek
assisted suicide suffer from mental dementia); Edward R. Grant & Paul Benjamin Linton,
Relief or Reproach?: Euthanasia Rights in the Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR. L. REV. 449, 531
(1995) (stating that ninety percent of those who commit suicide have mental disorder).
22 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997) (citing HERBERT
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Obviously one solution here should be access to good counsel-
ing. A recent edition of the New York Times contained a good
article that exemplified the contrasting tendencies here. 23 By so-
cially sanctioning this new right, the behavior will always appear
to be rational because, after all, people will just be "exercising
their rights." The social and economic incentives will all be in fa-
vor of taking the request at face value and acting upon it.24 Two
studies from the Netherlands reinforce this conclusion.25 For ex-
ample, cases in the Netherlands demonstrate that depression is
no longer seen as a mental illness needing diagnosis and treat-
ment for those requesting death.26 Instead, it is considered a le-
gitimate reason for requesting death.27
Third, legalizing assisted suicide will create disincentives
against developing and providing palliative care. A basic tenet of
medical ethics is to cure whenever possible and provide comfort
care when cure is not possible. 28 Medicine is labeled the "healing
profession" because the basic function of medicine is healing.
29
HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND THE DUTCH CURE 24-25 (1997)
(explaining that suicidal, terminally ill patients who receive depressive illness medication
usually have positive feelings about their lives); Clark, supra note 21, at 129 (asserting
that physicians should seek help from psychiatric professionals in treating mental illness
when patients request assisted suicide); Grant & Linton, supra note 21, at 130-32 (stating
that there is correlation between depression, terminal illness and assisted suicide); see also
N.Y.S. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 144 (noting high correlation between depres-
sion and suicide).
23 See Thomas Friedman, Profession Divided Over Assisted-Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1997, at Al. One doctor discussed his decision to ease a patient's pain by quickening
their death after listening to the patient. Id. By contrast, another stated:
I have had patients say to me, "can't you just give me a pill and get this over with?"
But on further exploration there is almost always something remedial behind it. It is
often related feeling like a burden, or being incapacitated or social isolation. So, I am
very worried about a doctor affirming that the behavior is rational.
Id. at A16.
24 See Doerflinger, supra note 17, at 528 (stating that freedom to provide lethal drugs
is convenient solution for rising healthcare costs).
25 See Carlos F. Gomez, M.D., REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF
THE NETHERLANDS 1 (1996) (analyzing trends in Netherlands and concluding that too
many people are choosing to commit suicide); Herbert Hendin, SEDUCED BY DEATH:
DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND THE DUTCH CARE 1 (1997) (examining Dutch experience with
physician-assisted suicide and predicting that if physician-assisted suicide is legalized
United States it will likewise be abused).
26 See Gomez, supra note 25, at 27-35 (pointing out increase in numbers of depressed
who are seeking assistance in dying).
27 See Hendin, supra note 25, at 140-47 (discussing high number of depressed patients
are seeking assisted suicide).
28 See Peter M. Mcgough, M.D., Symposium: Physician-Assisted Suicide Medical Con-
cerns About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 521, 523-30 (1995)
(describing healing as medical professionals' primary goal).
29 See C. Everett Koop, Introduction to Symposium on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 35
DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1996) (examining Hippocratic oath); Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health
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The rule of Hippocratic medicine, as Dr. Bristow pointed out,
prohibits the killing of patients. 30 That rule is a key incentive
that focuses physicians on healing, both in their minds and in the
minds of their patient, and most importantly, in the minds of so-
ciety as a whole. 31
The noted social anthropologist Margaret Mead aptly summa-
rized this situation.32 The worst part of the notion of assisted
suicide is involving the medical profession to sanctify the process.
The most powerful incentives are those that focus physicians on
healing and alleviating suffering.
At the University of Chicago, a hospice physician by the name
of Steven Miles, who is widely published in the medical litera-
ture, had a deep understanding of this relationship. He has em-
phasized, "[o]nly because I knew that I could not and would not
kill my patients was I able to enter most fully and intimately into
caring for them as they lay dying."3 3
All of us are better off by having physicians with an individual
ethic and an undivided focus on healing and alleviating suffering.
At a time when long-standing physician-patient relationships are
becoming more and more uncommon, the disincentives against
Care: Including Alternatives and Complementary Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory
Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 160 (1996) (stating that primary role of all health profes-
sionals is patient care); Stacy A. Ragon, Comment, A Doctor's Dilemma: Resolving the Con-
flict Between Physician Participation in Executions and the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics,
20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 998 (1995) (describing doctor's role as care giver).
30 See Lonnie Bristow, M.D., Physician's Role as Healer: American Medical Associa-
tion's Opposition to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 653
(1997).
31 See Ben Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Reconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 77, 85-90 (1993) (describing oath in modern practice of medicine). But see
Clark, supra note 21, at 88 (arguing that Hippocratic oath is not followed in all cases and
thus does not have to be followed with regard to physician-assisted suicide).
32 See MARGARET MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE: A STUDY OF THE SEXES IN A CHANGING
WORLD (1949); MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
1(1935).
Throughout the primitive world the doctor and the sorcerer tend to be the same per-
son. He with the power to kill had the power to cure. With the Greeks, [referring to
Hippocratic oath,] the distinction was made clear. One profession was to be dedicated
completely to life under all circumstances regardless of rank, age or intellect. This, is a
priceless possession which we can not afford to tarnish.
But society is always attempting to make the position into a killer. To kill the defec-
tive child at birth, to leave the sleeping pills beside the bed of the cancer patient, it is
the duty of society to protect the physician from such requests.
Id.
33 See Steven H. Miles, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Profession's Gyrocompass,
25 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 1, 17-18 (1995) (questioning necessity for physician involve-
ment in assisted suicide).
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thorough counseling will grow. 34 Therefore maintaining a clear
line on this issue becomes all the more compelling.
Fourth, legalizing assisted suicide would create enormous in-
centives against regulation. 35 This was also demonstrated in the
January oral arguments in the Supreme Court. 36 Proponents for
assisted suicide urged the court to strike down these total prohi-
bitions on assisted suicide and leave the state legislatures unfet-
tered in regulating it. 3 7 But, as many justices noted, that is not
the way constitutional rights work. 38 There is a presumption
against regulating constitutional rights.39
The Dutch experience demonstrates the futility of reliance on
legal regulations to maintain such limits. 40 The guidelines estab-
lished by Dutch courts have not been followed. 41 The practice of
euthanasia has moved from the terminally ill to the chronically
ill, from untreatable physical illness to cases of treatable psycho-
logical distress, and from voluntary euthanasia to involuntary
euthanasia. 42 Rather than regulate, the incentives will be to-
34 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of American Ass'n of Homes & Services for the Aging et. al.
at 1, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) (arguing that issue of physician-
assisted suicide undermines already fragile physician-patient relationship).
35 See generally Callahan & White, supra note 11, at 1 (reviewing and critiquing vari-
ous regulatory schemes); Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed
"Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L.REV. 969, 971 (1958) (stating that legal condem-
nation of mercy-killings turns physicians and relatives away from euthanasia in doubtful
cases).
36 See Quill, Oral Arguments, supra note 13 (providing transcript of arguments before
Court); Glucksberg, Oral Arguments, supra note 13 (same).
37 See Quill, Oral Arguments, supra note 13, at *44 (stating that New York already
has system designed regulate those utilizing physician-assisted suicide); Glucksberg, Oral
Arguments, supra note 13, at *38 (arguing that there should be code of regulations).
38 See Quill, Oral Arguments, supra note 13, at *44 (admonishing that constitutional
rights are not as malleable as Petitioner's contend).
39 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352-59 (1987) (finding that
regulation of prisoners constitutional rights was subject to scrutiny).
40 See Gomez, supra note 25, at 52-58 (arguing that legal regulations have not worked
in Netherlands); Hendin, supra note 25, at 140-47 (describing chaos surrounding Dutch
system); see also Grant & Linton, supra note 21, at 499 (asserting that Dutch experience is
out of control).
41 See Julia Belian, Comment, Deference to Doctors in Dutch Euthanasia Law, 10
EMORY INTL L. REV. 255, 273-77 (1996). The author asserts that the courts can not handle
the role of regulator. Id.; Wesley J. Smith, Sliding Down Euthanasia's Slippery Slope,
LEGAL TIMES, June 13, 1994, at 26. A Dutch court recently dismissed a murder charge
against a doctor accused of killing a severely deformed baby girl. Id. The court ruled he
had no choice, even though he did not meet the formal guidelines for prescribing assisted
suicide. Id.
42 See Leon R. Kass & Nelson Lund, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and
the Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 395, 412-13 (1996) (stating that re-
ports of euthanasia in Holland show that there were 2,300 voluntary euthanasia cases, 400
cases of physician-assisted suicide and over 1,000 case of involuntary euthanasia in 1990).
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ward making sure that every patient has the fullest knowledge of
this new right and option.
Finally, legalizing assisted suicide will create incentives
against alternatives for the chronically and the terminally ill.
Some of these will be medical. As Solicitor General Walter Del-
linger aptly told the Supreme Court, the least costly treatment
for any illness is lethal medication. 43 Likewise, Justice Breyer
pointed out that Great Britain, where assisted suicide is prohib-
ited, has many palliative care centers, while the Netherlands,
where assisted suicide is allowed, has few.44
Other disincentives will be social. Certainly legalization will
change the incentives and the psychodynamics for patients and
family members. While this may be overt in a case or two, it is
most likely to be subtle and unconscious in most cases.
Still others will be economic. At a time when managed care is
more and more common, and some form of explicit rationing
seems more and more likely, the disincentives against alterna-
tives should be fought rather than promoted.45 The economic
pressure for assisted suicide will be heightened if assisted suicide
is publicly subsidized, as Oregon has moved to do.46 Because of
these incentives and disincentives, I think it is appropriate to say
that legalizing assisted suicide would simply create more physi-
cal and psychological suffering than it would alleviate.
Ironically, legalizing assisted suicide would both aggravate the
primary fears that drive public opinion on this issue and create
disincentives for addressing those fears. It would do this in four
ways: By undermining the provision of pain medication and the
developments of new treatment; by undermining incentives for
the diagnosis and treatment of depression; by increasing finan-
cial pressures on patients to opt for assisted suicide; and by creat-
ing financial and social pressures on family members, which will
be inevitably deflected onto patients. Consequently, legalizing
assisted suicide for any will undermine healthcare for everyone. 47
43 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2272-80 (1997) (explaining that
death is always cheapest alternative).
44 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312 (citing British House of Lords report).
45 See Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Le-
thal Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions, 85 Cal.L.Rev. 371, 419-25 (1997)
(arguing that economic incentives will foster assisted suicide).
46 See WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1998, at 1.
47 See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 738 (1995) ('Before there can be such truly voluntary choice to termi-
1997]
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Two positive results have come from the nationwide debate on
assisted suicide over the last several years. One is the renewed
focus on enhancing alternatives for the chronically and termi-
nally ill. The second has to be a reminder of the many compel-
ling reasons for having and retaining the laws against assisted
suicide. The solution to this problem that we have been discuss-
ing is good medicine, not bad law.
Thank you.
nate life, there must be universal access to affordable health care. The lack of access to or
the financial burden of health care hardly permits voluntary choice for many.").
